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Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is under § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Issues: 
1. Does Appellant, Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. ("Lakeside"), have any 
legal right to take Farmington, Utah real property (the "Farmington 
Property") from Renee Evans ("Renee") to satisfy Lakeside's judgment 
against her husband, Dan Evans ("Dan")? 
2. Did the written 1989 Trust Agreement create three valid trusts: the DaRe 
Family Trust, Dan's trust (the "Daymond Trust") and Renee's trust (the 
"Revans Trust")? 
3. Did the 1989 Deed of transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee as 
trustee and sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust, violate the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act? 
4. After 1989 did Dan retain authority over property in the Revans Trust? 
5. After 1989 did Dan have a present vested legal or beneficial interest in the 
Farmington Property or any other property held in the Revans Trust? 
6. Did a 1997 resignation or removal of Dan as a trustee of the Revans Trust 
constitute a transfer in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act? 
7. Did the trial court err in granting Summary Judgment to Renee? 
3 
Standard for Review: 
The case of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65; 52 P.3d 1190 f7, established a clear 
Standard of Review in matters of appeal of Summary Judgment: 
When reviewing the trial court's ruling in a motion for summary 
judgment, we consider all facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We 
review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
according no deference to that court's legal conclusions. In addition, 
we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon below. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue Presented for Review: 
Appellant objected to trial court's Order1 of summary judgment. That Order 
incorporated the trial court's own AMENDED MEMORANDUM.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. STATUTES RULES and CASES 
INTERPRETATION OF WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
This matter has raised no constitutional issue. Statutes need not be construed, 
as this matter may be determined upon the wording of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. Certain cases are cited herein but Appellant has no reason to believe that this 
matter rises to the magnitude that requires interpretation of any case of central 
importance. 
1
 Record, 01706 
2
 Record, 01708-01729 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
Dan and Renee purchased the Farmington Property on July 29, 1986.3 
On March 6, 19894 the Farmington Property was transferred to Renee Evans 
("Renee") in accordance with the provisions of Dan and Renee's 1989 written Trust 
Agreement.5 A Deed of transfer to Renee was signed, sealed and delivered on March 6, 
1989. That Deed was recorded on March 10, 1989.6 
It wasn't until ten years later that Lakeside first brought this action against 
Renee to take the Farmington Property away from her in an attempt to satisfy Lakeside's 
judgment that it had just then recently obtained against Dan. 
Course of Proceedings: 
On March 10, 1998, Lakeside obtained Judgment against Dan in the State of 
Arizona.7 On June 16, 1998, Lakeside filed its Arizona Judgment in Utah as the basis for 
bringing this present action against Dan and Renee in Farmington, Utah. 
Lakeside claims that what Dan and Renee did in 1989, ten years earlier, violated 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because the 1989 transfer was made for the intent 
to hinder, delay, and defraud Lakeside. 
3
 Record, 01259, line 7 
4
 Record, 00463 
5
 Record, 00362 
6
 Record, 00463 
7
 Record, 00184 
5 
Lakeside also claimed that it had a cause of action against Renee, claiming that in 
the 1989 Trust Agreement Dan retained vested rights of ownership in the Farmington 
Property sufficient to nullify the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed of transfer. 
Attempting to rely upon the case of Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987), Lakeside asked the trial court to set aside a ten-year old Trust Agreement and 
Deed or to find one or both the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed to be defective. 
Lakeside's claim is that the wording of the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed of transfer 
left Dan with an interest upon which Lakeside could levy judgment against Renee. 
Lakeside's objective was to take the Farmington Property away from Renee to 
satisfy Lakeside's newly obtained personal Judgment against Dan. 
The trial court ruled against Lakeside and entered its Order denying Lakeside's 
claims.8 Consequently, Lakeside filed this Appeal. 
Disposition in the Court Below: 
The trial courts opinion and Order was that: 
1. The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust.9 
2. The 1989 Deed, being signed by both Dan and Renee, constituted a transfer 
of the Farmington Property to Renee in trust under the Revans trust.10 
3. Dan and Renee's 1989 actions did not violate the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act.11 
8
 Record, 01706, Order 
9
 Record, 01716, last paragraph 
10
 Record, 01717, lines 11-12 
6 
4. The 1997 Amendment only clarifies language in an already valid trust and 
makes no substantial changes reflecting "actual intent" to hinder delay, or 
defraud Lakeside as a creditor of the Dan.12 
5. Dan "is a beneficiary" of all three trusts.13 
6. Dan, although a beneficiary, has no power of revocation.14 
7. Dan is entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing him from the case as 
to the issue of fraudulent transfer of property interests to Renee.15 
8. On November 22, 2000, the trial court dismissed all of Lakeside's alleged 
causes of action against Renee personally,16 
9. The trial court ruled that Renee is entitled to summary judgment dismissing all 
claims against her in her capacity as trustee as they pertain to the transfer of 
the Farmington Property to Renee by Deed and under the provisions of the 
1989 Trust Agreement that created the Revans Trust.17 
10. Renee is also entitled to summary judgment dismissing all claims against Dan 
as they pertain to the transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee by Deed 
and under the provisions of the 1989 Trust Agreement that created the 
Revans Trust. 
11
 Record, 01726, lines 8-11 
12
 Record, 01726, lines 18-20 
13
 Record, 01720, lines 18-19 
14
 Record, 01724, line 3 
15
 Record, 01728, lines 17-19 
16
 Record, 01713, lines 10-12 
17
 Record, 01728, lines 6-9 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dan & Renee —Background 
1. In 1984 Dan was employed as District Sales Manager for Trusswall 
Systems, Inc., headquartered in Dallas Texas.18 
2. Dan's District Sales Manager position required extensive travel in 
California, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada.19 
3. Subsequently, Dan worked for Action Wholesale Truss, living mostly in 
Las Vegas. 
4. On December 4, 1986, Dan and Renee borrowed money from Cache 
Mortgage. A Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note against the Farmington Property 
secured that loan. Dan and Renee bought the lot and built their own home on the lot, 
The Trust Deed Note obligation was for $57,000.00.21 
5. Dan continued employment outside Utah, living in Las Vegas,22 while 
Renee lived in the home that he and Renee had built on the Farmington Property.23 
6. Renee has been employed in retail sales and secretarial work since 1973.24 
7. Before 1992 Renee was employed at the women's clothing store in Salt 
Lake City named Classy Lady.25 
18
 Record, 01227, lines 4-16 
19
 Record, 01227, lines 4-14 
20
 Record, 01228, lines 1-21 
21 Record, 01258, line 22 through 01259, line 11 
22
 Record, 01228, lines 22-23 
23
 Record, 01228, lines 22-23 
24
 Record, 00264, paragraph 7 
8 
8. In 1992, after Dan got E.S. Systems established and operating in Nevada, 
Renee moved to Nevada to live with Dan.26 
9. They purchased a condominium in Henderson,27 a suburb of Las Vegas. 
10. During Renee's absence from Utah, Renee had a daughter, her sister-in-
law and brother-in law occupied the Farmington Property.28 They maintained the home 
and paid the utilities.29 
11. Living in Las Vegas, Renee worked as a secretary at E.S. Systems.30 
12. After E.S. Systems failed, Renee"s employment was at the Chevron Credit 
Union in North Salt Lake.31 
13. On June 26, 1992, Dan organized and began managing E.S. Systems L.C. 
("E.S. Systems"),32 a roof truss construction business33 that he located and operated in 
Las Vegas, Nevada until 1998.34 
14. Renee held no management position or ownership in E.S. Systems.35 
15. E.S. Systems engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of both 
commercial and residential roof truss systems in Las Vegas, and grew to attain annual 
sales of six to eight million dollars.36 
25
 Record, 01166, lines 16-22 
26
 Record, 01228, lines 22-25 and 00265, paragraph 8 
27
 Record, 01218, line 22 through 01219, line 8; and 01225, lines 2-17 
28
 Record, 01190-01191 and Record, 00265, paragraph 8 
29
 Record, 01191-01192 
30
 Record, 01167, lines 19; Record 01168, lines 1-5 
31
 Record, oll65, lines 11-19 and 01168, lines 16-19 
32
 Record, 00068 
33
 Deposition of Dan Evans, 12/7/2000, Record, 01222, lines 15-16 
9 
16. Lakeside Lumber Products ("Lakeside"), an Arizona company, provided 
lumber products to E. S. Systems: Lakeside later required that Evans sign a personal 
guarantee dated September 20, 1996. 
17. In 1998 E.S. Systems filed Bankruptcy in Nevada.38 
18. On May 27, 1997, Lakeside filed actions in Arizona against E.S. Systems 
and against Dan personally.39 
19. On March 10, 1998, Lakeside obtained judgment against E.S. Systems and 
a personal Judgment against Dan in Arizona.40 
20. On March 10, 1998, Lakeside filed its Arizona Judgment against Dan in 
Utah. Lakeside also filed its Complaint against both Dan and Renee before the Second 
Judicial District Court in Davis County.41 
21. Lakeside's Complaint sought to take the Farmington Property away from 
Renee to satisfy its personal Judgment against Dan by alleging that Dan and Renee had 
conspired to commit civil fraud against Lakeside as a creditor of Dan.42 
22. In Dan's first deposition taken by Lakeside in Las Vegas, responding to a 
question of any interest he may have in the Revans Trust, Dan said:43 
34
 Brief of Appellant, page 11, paragraph 38 
35
 Affidavit of Renee Evans, Record, 00264, also see Record, 01167, lines 18-19 
36
 Brief of Appellant, Page 10, paragraph 34 
37
 Record, 00145-00146 
38
 Deposition of Dan Evans, 12/7/2000, Record, 01222, lines 17-19 
39




 Record, 00168 
42
 Record, 00001-00009 
10 
Dan: I don't have any ownership in it." * * * 
Mr. Bullock: Who is the beneficiary? 
Dan: My wife I believe. 
Mr. Bullock: Are you a beneficiary? 
Dan: Not that I know of. I don't know. I don't believe so. 
23. The trial judge permitted extended discovery, argument and hearings over 
a period of more than three years, beginning on June 16, 1998 through April 2, 2001, 
permitting additional time for discovery as Lakeside requested, including additional 
depositions. Under that extended discovery granted by the trial court, on December 7, 
2000, Lakeside again took the deposition of Dan Evans.44 On the same date Lakeside 
also took the depositions of Renee Evans45 and Loren D. Martin.46 
24. At his second deposition in Salt Lake City, Dan was asked at if he had 
paid any expense, maintenance costs or utility fees for the Farrnington Property since 
June of 1997. Dan said "No."47 
25. Dan was also asked what he did with his paychecks after 1998. Dan said, 
"I cashed them"48 and gave the cash to Renee49 because I didn't "have a bank 
account."50 When Dan was asked, "Are you looking for a job now?" He said, "Yes."51 
43
 Record, 00187, lines 6-7 and Record, 00188, lines 6-11 
44
 Record, 01207 
45
 Record, 01157 
46
 Record, 01280 
47
 Record, 01233 
48
 Record. 01234, line 3 
49
 Record, 01234, line 4 
50
 Record, 01234, line 9 
51
 Record, 01233. line 6 
11 
26. At her deposition in Salt Lake City Renee was asked what assets she had 
i 
in 1989. Renee responded, saying that, "My only asset was the home, my house,"52 the 
Farmington Property. 
27. Renee was questioned extensively as to her interest in the Farmington 
Property, leading to its final questions in which Lakeside pointedly challenged Renee's 
ownership and title to The Property, her home: 
Mr. Bullock: You claim because this is your trust for your benefit - -
Renee: That's my trust. That's my home that's in my trust. And I 
own it. That's what I state. 
Mr. Bullock: Individually? 
Renee: Individually. [Whereupon Renee's Deposition Ended.] 
Dan and Renee's 1989 Creation of the Three Trusts 
28. Three years prior to organization of E.S. Systems, Dan and Renee created 
three Trusts within a single written Trust Agreement.54 
29. On March 6, 1989, by written Trust Agreement55 and funding documents, 
Dan and Renee created and funded three separate trusts,56 a Family Trust, Dan's Trust 
and Renee's Trust. 
30. Dan's Trust (the "Daymond Trust") was funded with items of personal 
property. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, the Daymond Trust exclusively held 
all right, title and interests in the property held under the Daymond Trust.57 
52
 Record, 01197, line 11 
53
 Record, 01200, lines 18-23 
54
 Record, 00362-00387 
55
 Record, 00364-00385 
56
 Record, 01188, lines 9-11 
12 
31. Renee expressly waived all interest in all property held under the 
Daymond Trust, "including community property interest and separate property 
interests therein."58 
32. And Dan continued his employment.59 
33. Lakeside has brought forth no evidence that Dan could not or did not pay 
his debts after his 1989 transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee. Consequently, 
Lakeside's allegation that Dan was insolvent in 1989 fails, remaining as unfounded and 
unproved speculation. 
34. Renee's Trust (the "Revans Trust") was funded with items of property. 
Upon funding, among the Revans Trust exclusively held all right, title and interest in the 
Farmington Property.60 
35. And Renee continued her employment.61 
36. A Quitclaim Deed, transferring The Farmington Property into the Revans 
Trust, was signed, sealed and delivered on March 6, 1989.62 
37. On March 10, 1989 that Deed of transfer to Renee was recorded.63 
38. Thereafter, Renee held exclusive right, title and interest, both legal and 
beneficial, in the Farmington Property.64 
57
 Record, 00385 
58
 Record, 00363, lines 6-8 
59
 Record, 01228, lines 1-21 
60
 Record, 00384 
61
 Record, 01166, lines 16-22 
62
 Record, 00463 
63
 Record, 00463 
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39. Dan expressly waived all interest in property transferred to the Revans 
Trust, "including community property interest and separate property interests 
therein."65 
40. Lakeside has brought forth no evidence that Renee could not or did not 
pay all her debts after 1989. 
41. And Renee continued her employment.66 
42. The 1989 Trust Agreement67 provided that: 
Separate Trust. Each Grantor reserves and grants to the other the right 
and power to alter, amend, or revoke this Agreement, with respect to his or 
her separate trust, in whole or in part, at any time and from time to time 
without the consent of Trustee or any other person. 
43. Initially,68 from 1989 and until June 20, 1997,69 Dan and Renee were both 
70 
trustees of the Revans Trust. 
44. On June 20, 1997, Renee amended the Revans Trust,71 
45. On June 20, 1997, Renee also caused a second document to be signed, 
sealed, delivered and recorded; giving public notice that Dan was no longer a 
trustee. That document stated that, "The purpose of this document is to reflect 
Record, 00384 
Record, 00363, lines 8-11 
Record, 00264, paragraph 7 
Record, 00391, paragraph 4 
Record, 01453 
Record, 00-
Record, 00391, paragraph 4 
Record, 00441-00461 
Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22 
14 
that Daniel R. Evans, was no longer a trustee/7 A copy of that document is 
included in the Addendum.74 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The 1989 Trust Agreement and Transfers Between Dan and Renee: 
The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust. 1989 Deed constituted 
a transfer of title of the Farmington Property to Renee in her capacity both as trustee 
and beneficiary. The merger of authority of trustee and beneficiary constitutes a 
transfer of all right, title and interest. After the 1989 transfer the Farmington Property 
was hers. The 1989 Deed of transfer was not revocable by Dan. Dan's clear intent 
expressed in the Trust Agreement and the Deed of transfer to Renee was to transfer full 
title of the Farmington Property to Renee. Dan has no authority to call it back. 
Lakeside has argued that in the 1989 Trust Agreement, Dan retained authority to 
revoke and amend the DaRe Family, thereby causing a revocation of the Revans Trust 
and return of the Farmington Property to him. Lakeside's theory is that if Dan could 
somehow revoke the Trust Agreement then Lakeside, acting through Dan, may have the 
same right, including the right to revoke all three trusts and nullify the Trust Agreement. 
Yet Lakeside has failed to argue that Dan had authority to nullify a specific 
written, signed, sealed, delivered and recorded Quitclaim Deed under which he 
transferred of all rights, both legal and beneficial, in the Farmington Property to Renee. 
Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22 
Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22 
15 
But revoke the Trust Agreement and the Deed would still stand. The law does not 
require that an agreement and transfer in trust must be reduced to writing. 
Lakeside has failed to cite any facts or law upon which to rest its claim of legal 
authority to overturn established case law that holds that Renee's interest obtained in 
the Farmington Property in 1989 at that time constituted a presently vested interest. 
Lakeside has also chosen to ignore that in the 1989 Trust Agreement Dan had 
expressly waived all right, title and interest to the Farmington Property. 
Lakeside also tries to skirt another major issue — the Four-Year Statute of 
Limitations under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. The limitation on bring an action 
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is four years. So even if Dan's 1989 transfer 
to Renee did violate the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, ten (10) years earlier is 
unquestionably beyond the four-year statute of limitations. Lakeside's allegations in 
regard to what happened ten-years ago are untimely and barred. 
Lakeside cannot in good faith claim that in 1989 Dan or Renee conspired to 
defraud Lakeside. That is because in 1989 Dan and Renee did not even know that 
Lakeside existed. Lakesides' attempts at any such claim against either Dan or Renee 
cannot be brought in good faith. Mere speculation or accusation without facts or law 
does not constitute reasonable extension of the law or evidence Lakeside's good faith. 
In 1989 Dan and Renee didn't even know that Lakeside existed. That being the 
case, what basis in law or fact would now support any allegation that in 1989 Dan and 
Renee conspired to defraud Lakeside. The 1989 transfer could not violate the Uniform 
16 
Fraudulent Transfer Act as to Lakeside as a creditor. Lakeside didn't even exist. If 
Lakeside's arguments were to prevail no statute of limitations would ever run on any 
transfer, even under business law where property is often transferred to or between 
corporations, business trust, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. 
In a nutshell, Lakeside is asking this Court to effectively open the door to any 
unknown future creditor, giving that unknown future creditor or claimant the right to 
litigate any previous transfer made by any person. It may even be argued that what 
Lakeside is attempting to do is to use the courts as if the courts would unwittingly 
concur in giving all creditors the power to litigate everything forever. That must not be 
permitted because granting power to litigate is power to destroy. 
Finally, the 1997 removal or resignation of Dan as a trustee did not constitute a 
transfer. Before Dan resigned or was removed, Renee held both legal and beneficial 
interest. After Dan's resignation or removal, Renee remained holding both legal and 
beneficial interest in the Farmington Property. Nothing changed. Consequently, any 




The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust. 
The validity of a trust is an issue of law to be reviewed for correctness. Flake v. 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, % 
The well established law of trusts followed in Flake v. Flake, at j^l 1, is that, 
A trust is an arrangement for the ownership of property. The nature of 
the arrangement is such that the legal title of the property is held by the 
trustee, but the benefit and enjoyment of the property resides with the 
beneficiaries. It is well settled that [a] trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship 
with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the [legal record] 
title to the property is held [the trustee] to equitable duties to deal with the 
property for the benefit of another person [the beneficiary], which arises 
as a result of a manifestation [by the settlor, or trustor] of an intention to 
create it. [Emphasis added.] 
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts fi 2 (1959)). There must be an intent by 
the settlor to confer a beneficial interest in the property in some other 
person. To create an inter vivos trust, 
[a] settlor must have an intent to create a presently enforceable trust, . . 
• the trust property must be clearly specified and set aside, . . . and the 
essential terms of the trust must be clear enough for the court to enforce 
the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust relationship. 
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
"A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is 
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the 
benefit of beneficiaries." Cont'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club 
Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts fi 2 (1959)). The trustee has exclusive control of the 
trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust 
instrument, and "once the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the 
owner of the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is 
18 
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (citalion omitted). A 
trust must have an identifiable beneficiary who is capable of enforcing the 
equitable duties of the trustee. The transfer of property interests to the 
beneficiaries "cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a 
provision of the trust instrument . . . ." George G. Bogert & [***12] 
George T. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees 6 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983). 
Both Dan's and Renee's 1989 actions that in creation of a 1989 Trust Agreement 
and Deed of transfer met all of the requirements of Flake and Sundquist. 
Acting as a settler in 1989, Dan executed a written Trust Agreement and Deed of 
transfer. Execution of the Trust Agreement, the Deed and the facts of this case leave no 
doubt of Dan's intent. Dan's intent in 1989 was to transfer all legal and beneficial right, 
title and interest in the Farmington Property to Renee. 
Joining with Renee in creating the Revans Trust, Dan evidenced his intent in 
writing and with his signature on the Trust Agreement and his signature on the Deed — 
signed, sealed, delivered and recorded. Dan's intent is clear. Dan's intent was to 
transfer all right, title and interest in the Farmington Property to Renee. 
The Farmington Property was clearly set aside and transferred to Renee by a 
recorded Deed. 
The essential terms of the Trust Agreement and establishment of the Revans 
Trust and the transfer by Deed of the Farmington Property are clear enough for the 
courts to enforce, even against Dan. 
19 
After the Deed was recorded in 1989 the Property was Renee's. Renee held both 
legal and equitable title. After 1989 Dan had no right under law or authority of any kind 
to take the Farmington Property back or to transfer it from Renee to anyone else. 
Lakeside has failed to bring forward any basis under law or fact that it has any 
right to the Farmington Property superior to Dan's. Lakeside has never made any claim 
that it has any contractual right to the Farmington Property except through its judgment 
against Dan. In other words, if Dan cannot get it back neither can Lakeside. 
POINT 2 
Lakeside's accusation that Dan and Renee concealed the 1989 
transfer is false, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. 
Lakeside states in its Brief that it,75 
Brought its claim of action against Dan Evans within one year of the 
Plaintiffs discovery of the transfer of the Farmington Property to the 
trustees of the Revans Trust. The transfer was discovered by Plaintiff in 
March of 1998. Plaintiff within three months of this discovery filed the 
complaint and served the complaint on Defendants. Plaintiff met the time 
limitation of Utah Code Ann. §25-6-10(1) (1995) by bringing its action 
within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably 
have been discovered by Plaintiff. 
As a matter of law, any such inference or allegation is false. Transfer of the 
Farmington Property in trust to Renee was made in 1989. The Deed of transfer was 
signed, sealed, delivered and recorded as a public document in 1989. As a matter of law 
the recording of the Deed that transferred the Farmington Property to Renee constitutes 
notice to all, including Lakeside. Any claim or inference otherwise is just false. 
75
 Appellant's Brief, page 48, lines 24-26 
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Lakeside knew or must have known that there is no basis in fact or law to make any 
such allegation. 
Making any such allegation flies in the face of the well-established state of the 
law. See: Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, at 52; 287 (Utah 1996) 
The creditors claimed that the statute did not begin to run until they 
had actual notice of the facts constituting the fraud. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 
1197. We held that the creditors would have discovered the conveyance 
had they conducted a normal search of property upon which to levy when 
they received their judgment against the debtor. Id. Lacking allegations 
that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent 
conveyance, we held that the creditors were on constructive notice of the 
conveyance, and therefore its fraudulent nature, because "the means of 
knowledge were available" to the creditors. 
It is not an unreasonable extension of the law to impose the same standard of due 
diligence and obligation to inquire upon Lakeside. There is no evidence that Lakeside 
ever asked Dan for any credit statement or asset disclosure before extending its credit. 
Any attempt to answer why Lakeside made never asked for a credit report or made 
any inquiry as to Dan's assets will only lead to speculation. But, maybe there is 
someone within the Lakeside organization that may have just dropped the ball and is 
just trying to use this extended and expensive litigation to cover his or her tracks. Who 
knows? Maybe this action is nothing more than just following Lakesides written 
company policy. 
But it is certain that the 1989 recorded Deed speaks loudly against Lakeside's 
accusation that either Dan or Renee concealed the 1989 transfer. 
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The fact is that when Lakeside demanded that Dan sign a personal guarantee or 
belatedly discovered that it had no personal guarantee, Lakeside made no inquiry and 
completely neglected its obligation of due diligence. What Lakeside is trying to do is 
blame Dan and Renee for its own neglect. 
The Fraudulent Transfer Act prohibits and provides a remedy for malevolent 
intent to defraud. Inherent in the nature of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is the 
prohibition against "actual intent" directed toward some real, immediate, imminent, 
imminently anticipated, perceived or envisioned creditor. The Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act does not apply either forever into the future are in favor of an unknown 
and entirely unanticipated potential future creditor. 
POINT 3 
Resignation or removal of a Trustee does not constitute a transfer. 
Resignation or removal of a Trustee of property held in trust does not constitute 
a transfer. The Farmington Property was transferred to Renee in 1989. The 1989 Trust 
and Deed to Renee did constitute a transfer to Renee in trust. 
But neither a 1997 recorded document or any of the 1997 acts of Dan nor Renee 
constituted a "transfer" as defined under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
The written text of Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UCA 25-6-2(12), does 
specifically define a transfer: 
25-6-2. In this chapter: 
* * * 
(12) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
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asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. [Emphasis added.] 
Resignation or removal of a Trustee in trust does not constitute a transfer of title 
in real property any more that the resignation of removal of a President of a corporation, 
General Partner or Manager of a limited liability company. Resignation or removal of the 
Trustee, General Partner, Manager or a President does not effectuate a transfer of title to 
property held in trust or under a State of Utah or any other State business franchise 
governed under law. 
Finally, Lakeside's major difficulty is that it has no case unless it can somehow 
avoid the four-year statute of limitations imposed by law under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. But in Lakeside's attempt and underlying Lakeside's arguments, there 
appears to be a broad brush claim that any person who makes any attempt to limit 
personal liability is committing fraud under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 
continuum and forever after against any future creditor. But if such were the law there 
would be no corporations. In fact, history reflects that the same argument was once 
used against corporate organizations and business trusts. 
It just may be appropriate at this moment to slightly modify and paraphrase the 
famous quote from the 1934 tax case opinion authored by Judge Learned Hand. Judge 
Hand wrote that,76 "No person is required to so arrange their affairs in such a manner as 
to make themselves the most vulnerable to the vicissitudes of life." 
The "quote" from Judge Hand is substantially changed for this present situation. 
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The Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 25-6-2(12) UCA, defines the word 
"Transfer." 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. [Emphasis added.] 
Appellant's claim is that Dan's June 20, 1997, removal or resignation as a trustee 
constituted a "Transfer". It appears from the record that Lakeside is doing nothing 
more that attempt to expand upon what was a trial court error. 
POINT 4 
Renee's June 27, 1997 Amendment of the Revans Trust and her removal or 
the resignation of Dan as a trustee did not constitute a transfer. 
Dan and Renee's 1989 Trust Agreement provided that: 
Property held as "The Revans Trust" is the exclusive property of Renee 
Poulsen Evans and Daniel Raymond Evans hereby expressly waives all 
interests, including community property interests and separate property 
interest therein. 
In expressly waiving all interest in the Farmington Property contained in the 
Revans Trust, Dan waived his right to revocation of the Revans Trust. The rule of 
estoppel, if necessary, must be applied should Dan ever look to claim otherwise. 
To the contrary, as a trustee Dan accepted and is bound by his duty as a trustee 
to defend and protect the corpus of the Revans Trust for the benefit of Renee. 
Lakeside, having no right superior to Dan's, may claim no legal right or duty 
other than that held by Dan. 
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Lakeside has no right to claim any greater authority or less responsibility to 
protect Renee as she is the sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust. 
Under the 1989 Trust Agreement and 1989 Deed of transfer, Renee received a 
"presently vested interest" in the Farmington Property in 1989. From that moment the 
Deed was signed, sealed and delivered, Renee held both legal and beneficial title. From 
that moment to the present the Farmington Property has been hers. Renee was and is 
the sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust. In arguing otherwise, Lakesides must ignore 
the principles of two previously cited and controlling cases of recent date: Flake v. 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589; and Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65; 52 P.3d 1190. 
CONCLUSION—RELIEF SOUGHT 
Recognizing that Lakeside had previously obtained judgment against Dan Evans 
in Arizona and that such judgment had been previously filed with the Second Judicial 
District Court, it is prayed that the Court of Appeals enter its ruling that this matter be 
remanded to the Second Judicial District Court directing that: 
1. This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of 
action, as to Renee Evans in her capacily as trustee of the DaRe Family Trust, the 
Daymond Trust and the Revans Trust; 
2. This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of 
action, as to Renee Evans personally; 
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3. This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of 
action, as to Dan Evans in his capacity as trustee or former trustee acting under 
authority of any provision of the 1989 Trust Agreement; 
4. This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of 
action, granting Dan partial summary judgment dismissing him from any matter related 
to the issue of transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee; and 
5. That the trial court conduct such other and additional proceedings and 
enter such additional orders as the trial court may deem just. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 2004. 
LOREN D.MARTIN, PC 
Counsel for Appellee 
^/4fef 
en D. Martir 
orney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the bound version of the foregoing Appellee's 
Brief was lodged with the Court of Appeals and placed in the US Mail, postage prepaid 
on the 17thday of August, 2004, addressed to: 
Bullock Law Firm 
353 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Din R. Evtns A Rcncc Evins. Trustees ^ ^ A P A S ? i f l O i 5 ! l L F Y 3 S 0 R 2 l 2 ^ 
Tfte D*Re fimily Trust ^CB
 Cfift m M f t i ftrMrc 
138 E. Piucle Circle 
Bountiful, wU*» 84010 
(Spice Above for Recorder11 Use) 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
DANIEL R. EVANS and RENEE EVANS, grantors of Bountiful. County of Davis, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT CLAIM to Dan R. Evans and Renee Evans Trustees of THE REVANS 
TRUST, dated the 6th day of March, 1989, grantee of Davis County, Utah, ix the sum of Ten 
and 00/100 (S10.00) DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following 
described tract of land located at 138 East Paracle Circle, Farmington, Davis, County, State of 
Utah, more particularly described as: 
oi-on-ooo£ 
All of Lot 5, HIGHT SUBDIVISION, according to the offidal plat 
thereof, on file and of record in the Davis County Recorder's Office. 
THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE(S) HAVE FULL RIGHTS TO SELL OR EN CUMBER 
Tl IE PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this 6th day of March, 1989. 
STATE OF Utah 
County of Davis 
) 
%% ) 
On the 6th day of March, 1989. personally appeared before me DANIEL R. EVANS and 
* RENEE EVANS thesigners of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thkt they 
executed the same." *• 
My Commission csp 
00463 
State or ursn 
Department of Commerce 
OivUlon oi Co'ooratlofn *nrl Commercial Code l i  d i l  / \ si /] / / J * ^ 
Division af^nereby l«u> 
I Hereby ccrtlfv mat the 
and approved on thffi „ _ 
n the office oifthl? >d^nefeb  iTsue
I U Certlficamfiereof /] ' 
Gary R. Hansen ARTICLES O F ORGANIZATION 
Oivtslon Oi rector O F 
E.S. SYSTEMS, L.C. 
A Utah Limited Liability Company 
Organized under the Laws of the State of Utah 
The undersigned persons, each being more than eighteen years of age, hereby establish a 
limited liability company pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, and adopt the 
following articles of organization: 
A. The name of the limited liability company is E.S. SYSTEMS, L.C. 
B. The period of duration shall be thirty-five (35) years. 
C. The limited liability company is organized for any legal and lawful purpose pursuant to the 
Utah Limited Liability Company Act 
D. The address of the registered office of the limited liability company is 138 East Parade 
Circle, Farmington, Utah 84025. The name of its registered agent at such address is Dan 
R. Evans. 
E. The director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is appointed the agent 
of the limited liability company for service of process if the agent has resigned, the agent's 
authority has been revoked, or the agent cannot be found or served with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. 5 !5 X 
' x j 
Management of the Company is vested in a Manager. The Manager is: Dan E£ Evans; 1 3 8 ^ —. 
East Parade Circle, Farmington, Utah 84025. • • Si ^ [T] 
Dated June t& . 1992 
Dan R. Evans, Manager, *U Dan R* Evans, Registered Agent r\7 
Attorney-in-Fact for all Members 
306|. 
wot raccreeo MML TOI 
Dinltl R. 4 R«n«« Evan* 
H«nd«r«nn., ¥V aRQll 
C 1 1 7 9 8 3 4 I 1 8 7 3 f 8 2 3 
CAACL D M fMCr OAVIt CXTT KCOttCR 
i m HAT U 3130 PT1 FE£ 10,00 OCF ntC 
ttC'O FM A S W C H T O T1TU COTNMY 
Order/Loan No. 
P U L L R B C O N V S Y A N C E 
RTnHR Ft1ST WATTOWA! lAyt. R.A 
TruatM under Deed of 
JOA2L corporation, aa duJy appointed 
Truat harein-aftar referred to, having raceiveil fro* 
holder of the obligaticna thereunder a written request to reoonvey, reciting 
that all sums secured by Mid Deed of Truat have bean fully paid, and Mid Deed 
of Truat and the note or notM secured thereby having been aurrendend to Mid 
TruatM for cancellation, does hereby FBOCNVEr, without warranty, to the person 
or persona legally entitled thereto, the aetata now held by i t thereunder. 
Said Deed of Truat WM ttrecuted ^ j^Ajpjn, fr tyMl I P tffHI ETilffi —'-
Trustor, and recorded in the offlclaXrecocda of ftirrt County, Utah, M 
follows: 
Date: DEC, A. 1986 
at Page JJ^ 
M Instrument Mo, oiftiafi , in Book m a 
Description: 
ALL OF LOT 5 . MICHT SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO TBI O m C l A L P U T THDUTOF, Of 
FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE DAVIS COURT! XXCOftDOl'S 0F7ICZ. 
61-6^1-6003 
In Witness hereof, ZIOHS FIRST NATIONAL RABKM TruatM, has caused i t s 
corporate name to be hereto affixed this 18TB , day of MAT » ±MX 1995. 
ZIONS FUST JUTXOXAL UMt N.A. 
JtrtJ 
M TruatM 
RICHARD I- EARR 
STATE Of UTAH ) 
• M . 
COUNTY OP DAVIS ) 
' d*Y o* HAT # iSSA, personally appaarad bnfoce m, 
, who being duly "sworn did say that ha is the ecatttRClAL 
On the 18TH 
the Mid RICflAJtD I.VAJLR
 m . • • 
LOAN OFFICIR of lloyaTriRST IATICJULL lAHfc and that the witFln and foregoing 
InatruMnt ta i signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors and said RICHARD I . VARR COM duly acknowledge to m 
that said corporation executed the tee* . 
Hy Ccmmission Rxpireft 
10-03-98 
•J%ffe8toy ati 
IALT ua cm, UTAH 
GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
In consideration of Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc., and any of its subsidiaries or affiliates 
(hereinafter "Lakeside Lumber") advancing credit to E.S. Systems, LC. (hereinafter "Debtor"), 
and also in consideration of Lakeside Lumber entering into other transaction of any kind with 
Debtor, with or without security, the undersigned, (hereinafter called "Guarantor"), does 
hereby guaranty and agree to pay Lakeside Lumber, upon demand, all obligations of Debtor 
to Lakeside Lumber, including all past and future attorney's fees, and breaches of warranty 
arising from transactions between Lakeside Lumber and Debtor. 
The liability of Guarantor shall be unlimited. This guaranty shall continue until Lakeside 
Lumber shall receive from the Guarantor notice of revocation, which revocation shall be 
effective only as to subsequent obligations or transactions between Debtor and Lakeside 
Lumber. 
This guaranty is absolute and unconditional, and shall take effect immediately upon its 
execution by the Guarantor. This guaranty shall be enforceable as a primary obligation of the 
Guarantor without Lakeside Lumber first having to pursue any of its remedies against the 
Debtor. The undersigned hereby waives notice of acceptance hereof, notice of any 
transactions between Debtor and Lakeside Lumber, or of any other charge or liability of 
Debtor to Lakeside Lumber, and further waives presentment, demand, protest, and notice of 
protest, or notice of default. Guarantor authorizes Lakeside Lumber to renew or extend the 
time for any guaranteed payment or obligation, to deal with the Debtor without notice to the 
Guarantor, and without the Guarantor's consent, in all respects at Lakeside Lumber's 
discretion, without affecting Guarantor's obligations hereunder. If Lakeside Lumber hires an 
attorney to enforce the terms of this guaranty, Guarantor shall pay reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred; if legal proceedings are filed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in both the trial and appellate courts. 
Nothing contained in this guaranty agreement, or any action taken to enforce the terms of this 
guaranty shall constitute a waiver of any claims, lien rights, or other remedies Lakeside 
Lumber may have against the debtor, or any third party. 
In the event the Guarantor is a corporation, each of the persons executing this agreement on 
behalf of the Guarantor covenant and warrant that they are duly authorized to execute this 
Guaranty on behalf of the corporation, and that the corporation is duly authorized to execute 
this guaranty. In the event there is more than one Guarantor, their liabilities under this 
agreement shall be joint and several, and the revocation or release of any liability under this 
agreement as to one Guarantor shall not affect the liabilities of the other Guarantors. In 
construing this agreement, the singular shall include the plural and the plural shall include 
the singular. It is understood and agreed that this guaranty is delivered in the State of 
Arizona and shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of Arizona. 
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Dated this day of $J^2$ . 1996. 
Mr. Dan R. Evans, as an individual 
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QUITCLAIM DEED 
Dan R. Evens and Rence Evans, acting as Trustee of THE REV ANS TRUST dated March 6, 
1989. grantor of Farmington, County of Davis, State of Utah, nereby QUI TCLAIMS to: 
Rence Evans, Trustee of 
THE REVANS TRUST, 
dated March 6,1989, as amended June 20,1997, 
grantee of Davis County. Utah, for the sum of Ten and 00/100 (S10.00) DOLLARS and other 
good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land located at 138 East Parade 
Circle. Farmington. Davis County, State of V;Jh, more particularly described as: 
All of Lot 5. Higiu Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, on file and of 
record in ;»u- Davis County Recorder's Office 6 7 ' O M 7 ' CGOO 
(The purpose of this document is to reflect that Daniel R. Evans no longer serve* as a trustee.) 
THE GRAMOR AS TRUSTEE AND THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES) »VA\E FULL FCW-* A\X* vt-^om 
TO PROTECT, CONSERVE, SELL, LEASE, ENCUMBER, OR OTHERWISE MANAGE .\ND Pt3rO* E CV l. -
PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN. 
WITNESS rhc hand of said grantor on June 20U593^ 
Dan R. Evans, Trustee (former) 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tounty of Salt Lake 




On June 20. 1997, personally appeared before me Renee Evans, Trustee, and Dan R. 
Evans. Trujtee (former), the signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to mc 
that they executed the same. . . / ^ — 
r ~ - — • o ^ ^ * ;SS/y<ws$£ 
1
 s££$?^ Notary PuUtJc l / -f \ — T : 7 ^ 
\0&S&\ 10REN O.MARTIN , / / Rotary Public / 
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